

A Historical Study of the Falklands War: The Significance of How the War Was Represented in  
British Newspapers

Teemu Kokkonen

Bachelor's Seminar and Thesis (682285A)

English Philology

Faculty of Humanities

University of Oulu

Autumn 2018

## Abstract

This thesis will first investigate the Falklands War aboard the Task Force deployed at the Falkland Islands in the 1982 campaign, where Argentina claimed and conquered the islands, and then the United Kingdom reclaimed them. The second part of this thesis focuses on the newspaper coverage of the crisis, using *The Sun* and *The Guardian* as examples of how the coverage varies from one end of the journalistic correctness spectrum to the another. Aiding this analysis is field pioneer Norman Fairclough's take on Critical Discourse Analysis, CDA for short. His four "stages" of CDA will provide the means of dissecting both newspapers and determining their reasons of writing the way they did. Tying these two parts together are the situations, where the press themselves played a role in the course of events, such as the Battle of Goose Green. *The Sun* being a tabloid and *The Guardian* a broadsheet, the findings in the analysis correlate to the general norm that broadsheets produce more reliable and professional content than tabloids, and tabloids often carry political agendas.

*Keywords: The Falklands War, British military, Margaret Thatcher, The Sun, The Guardian, Critical Discourse Analysis*

## Tiivistelmä

Tutkielman tarkoitus on ensin tarkastella Falklandin sotaa historiallisesta näkökulmasta, pääpainona itse sotilaat Falklandin saarilla. Vuonna 1982 käydyssä sodassa Argentiina valtasi saaret voimakeinoin, ja Yhdistyneet Kuningaskunnat (Britannia) joutui ne valtaamaan takaisin. Tutkielman toinen osa tarkastelee sanomalehtien *The Sun* ja *The Guardian* otsikkoja ja artikkeleita sodasta, ja miten ne eroavat toisistaan. Tähän analyysiin käytetään Norman Faircloughin kriittistä diskurssianalyysia. Hänen kuvailemansa neljä "tasoa" auttavat ensin avaamaan ja sitten tutkimaan molempia sanomalehtiä, ja pääättelemään syyt sille, miksi lehdet kirjoittivat juuri niin kuin ne tekivät. Näitä kahta osaa sitovat yhteen tapahtumat, joiden kulkuun medialla oli suora tai epäsuora vaikutus, kuten Goose Greenin taistelu. Koska *The Sun* on tabloidi ja *The Guardian* perinteinen sanomalehti, tutkielman havainnot viittaavat yleiseen normiin, jonka mukaan perinteiset sanomalehdet tuottavat luotettavampaa ja ammattimaisempaa sisältöä kuin tabloidit, joilla usein on poliittisia taustapyrkimyksiä.

*Avainsanat: Falklandin sota, Britannian asevoimat, Margaret Thatcher, The Sun, The Guardian, Kriittinen diskurssianalyysi*

## Table of Contents

<b>1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2. The Falkland Islands .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>3. Falkland Islands War of 1982 .....</b>	<b>6</b>
3.1 British Retaliation .....	6
3.2 The Landing at San Carlos.....	7
3.3 Argentinian Bombing Runs .....	9
3.4 The Battle of Goose Green.....	11
3.5 Argentina Surrenders .....	14
<b>4. Media aboard the Task Force.....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>5. Methodology .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>6. Material: Newspapers.....</b>	<b>18</b>
6.1 The Sun .....	18
6.2 The Guardian .....	19
<b>7. Analysis .....</b>	<b>20</b>
7.1. Analysis of The Sun.....	20
7.2. Analysis of The Guardian .....	23
<b>8. Conclusion .....</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>List of references .....</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>Figures.....</b>	<b>30</b>

## 1. Introduction

The Falklands War was an armed conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982 for control over the Falkland Islands in Southern Atlantic. The conflict resulted in a decisive British victory, and the control of the islands remained with them. Going into war was rallied by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, first female Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. It was a big gamble, since her support was declining, but winning the war boosted her numbers again. Losing the war would have been disastrous both for her and the British Commonwealth as a whole. One of the main reasons to go to war was to demonstrate British military power, and their will to defend the entire Commonwealth. If the Falkland Islands would have been forfeited, other border disputes would have followed.

This thesis will first go through the key events of the Falklands War and the reasons of the British victory. Knowing and understanding the way the war played out is important for the analysis part of the thesis, and the first part's main role is to demonstrate the power discrepancies between United Kingdom and Argentina, preparing the reader for the analysis. Media representatives aboard the warships deployed to the Falklands played an important role not only in the course of events, but also in the way the general public back in the United Kingdom perceived the conflict. Analysing the newspapers of the era, focusing on the headlines, will provide us with information on how the papers reported of the Falklands War, and more importantly why.

The research questions for the analysis are:

1. What made Argentina and the United Kingdom go to war?  
Why did UK win and what were the key points in the campaign?
2. What difference is there between The Sun's and The Guardian's content?  
Is their content reliable, neutral and relevant to their audience?
3. Why did the newspapers write the way they did?

## 2. The Falkland Islands

The Falkland Islands (referred to as *the Falklands*) are a remote cluster of British-claimed islands east of the Argentinian coast, consisting of 2 large and around 780 smaller islands. Their climate is habitable, with summers being a bit cooler than European, but winters being warmer. In 1980, as it was the most recent data relative to this thesis, the population of the islands was 1 813 in total, mostly concentrated in the capital city of Stanley. The Falklands and their sea area cover 4 618 square miles (11 960 square kilometres) of the South Atlantic. (Freedman, 2005a, p. 14.) See figure 1 for details.

Since the Falklands are only 500 kilometres off the coast of Argentina, their ownership has been a source of arguments since 1833, when the islands were announced part of the Commonwealth. Argentina has claimed that the islands belong to it, but this contest has never been held in international court. For 15 years there had been talks in the British Government about the ownership of the islands, even to the point that some people were ready to give the Islands' sovereignty to Argentina. The Falklands War raised the people's will to hold on to the Islands, both on the Islands and in Britain. (Freedman, 2005a, p. 15.)




Figure 1. Map of the Falkland Islands.

### **3. Falkland Islands War of 1982**

In December 1981, a new Junta took over Argentina, led by General Galtieri, commander of the Argentinian army, now the president. Along with his comrades, Admiral Anaya, chief of the Navy and General Dozo, chief of the Air Force, General Galtieri now ran the whole country as the leader of the military Junta. (Freedman, 2005a, p. 132) This radical change of government led to expansionism, and the Junta set their sights on Falkland Islands, a British-owned territory east off the coast of Argentina.

On March 31<sup>st</sup>, 1982, the Argentine Task Force was finalizing its preparations to invade the Falklands. Intelligence reports reached the UK, and since the islands are across the Atlantic from them and so close to Argentina, the government knew that holding off the invasion was impossible. First Sea Lord (Chief of the British Navy), Admiral Sir Henry Leach told the government that reoccupation of the islands was possible, but it would take all the naval and aviation power that Britain could send. The force gathered and sent to the Falklands would consist of both of UK's aircraft carriers, their escorting ships, and a commando brigade with amphibious assault capabilities. Already stationed on the Falklands were a platoon of Royal Marines, 69 members to be exact. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 17.) A platoon cannot hold off an entire invading army, but an armed threat can force the invader to move cautiously and not to risk getting ambushed. The operation was named as CORPORATE (Freedman, 2005b, p. 18).

Local government on the Falkland Islands was warned about the invasion on April 1<sup>st</sup>. The Royal Marines on the islands were setting up ambushes and Governor Rex Hunt told the islanders via radio to stay home and remain calm. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 19). The Argentinians wanted to land on the night of March 31<sup>st</sup>, but weather conditions set them back for a full 24 hours. The invasion began in the morning of April 2<sup>nd</sup>, with approximately 1 000 men. Their advance was barely slowed, and the Royal Marines were resorted to defending the Government House in Stanley. The Marines fended off the attackers once, but were ultimately forced to surrender, and Governor Hunt was flown out of the islands. By then, the islands were completely in Argentinian control. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 22.)

#### **3.1 British Retaliation**

In the morning of April 2<sup>nd</sup>, London time, so four hours behind Stanley, the Cabinet met in London. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher decided to take a risk and propose a diplomatic and armed

response. Operation CORPORATE was in effect and the ships were getting prepared to sail to the Falkland Islands, but the decision of setting sail and engaging the enemy was not in the military's hands. In the evening, the Cabinet had made its decision and the Task Force would depart as soon as possible. This decision was done in the spirit of showing to the world that the United Kingdom would guarantee the safety of all its citizens, no matter how far they would be. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 26.)

As the voyage from the UK to the Falkland Islands takes from three weeks to a month, in the month of April, the fighting was mainly diplomatic and economic. On May 2<sup>nd</sup>, the Task Force fought its first battle against an enemy naval component. The submarine *SSN Conqueror* fired two torpedoes at the *ARA General Belgrano*, and both hit. The Argentinian destroyer was sinking and on fire, with some 200 men dead in the initial explosions. The rest of the men on board were scuttling the ship, leaving her to sink. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 196.) This event would be reported by The Sun, with their rather infamous "GOTCHA" headline (see figure 2), which, to this day, remains in people's memories about the Falklands War. This is one key event that will be discussed in the newspaper analysis segment of this thesis.

The sinking of the *Belgrano* would not be left unanswered by the Argentinians. On days before and on May 4<sup>th</sup>, there were multiple accounts of Argentinian air activity near the British Task Force. A pair of French-made Super Étendard -fighter jets took off from Rio Grande and found the British ships *HMS Glasgow* and *HMS Sheffield*. *Glasgow* released counter-measures, and the Argentinian jets took aim at *Sheffield* with their Exocet-missiles. Two missiles were released, and one of them hit *Sheffield*. She caught fire in multiple compartments, and even with the aid of fellow ships *Arrow* and *Yarmouth*, the fire could not be stopped. After an hour of firefighting, in fear of a second strike, the captain ordered the ship to be abandoned. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 200-202.) The loss of a ship was a big setback for the British, and the victory over *Belgrano* was overshadowed by it.

### 3.2 The Landing at San Carlos

As the diplomatic and media warfronts kept going, the military component had their fair share of action as well. On May 7<sup>th</sup>, *HMS Broadsword* and *HMS Coventry* were positioned to intercept any airplanes flying to or from Stanley airport, to cut off the Argentinian supply route. 2 days later, May 9<sup>th</sup>, they shot at a C130 Hercules trying to land in Stanley but missed. A stroke of luck for the British was that the deterrent was enough, and the plane veered back to mainland Argentina. Post-

war studies proved that this was a setback for the Argentinian force on the Falklands; many further air supply operations were cancelled in fear of losing precious cargo planes. The invasion force was large and needed a large amount of supplies to operate. They estimated that they would last for anywhere up to around 2 weeks, until 26<sup>th</sup> or the 27<sup>th</sup>, but at that date, a 75-tonne resupply would be necessary. The effect of this blockade was very demoralizing among the Argentinian soldiers suffering from various illnesses in the bad weather. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 276-277.)

The Argentinians garrisoned on the Falkland Islands felt severely let down by the mainland. Their air and naval components were passive, in fear of the British fighters and sea-to-air capabilities. Argentina was perfectly fine with stalling, since they assumed that Britain would not want to siege the islands forever, but to land someday. There, they would pull out their reserves and repel the British. This stalling would also provide time for negotiations and gaining support worldwide. Only issue is, that the troops on the islands continue to suffer from poor conditions and ever withering supplies. The British Task Force was prepared to keep up the siege and demoralise the occupiers even further, and then take the islands with relative ease. Stanley's garrison was the largest, and if it fell, the smaller forces around the islands would have little reason to continue the fight. The feat would be made no easier by the fact that Stanley was overlooked by hills that were very defensible, and the Argentinians had already fortified them. Retaking the capital city would take valuable time and even more valuable lives, especially if somehow the Argentinian's morale had held. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 287-289.)

Reclaiming the islands could not be done by sieging alone, so both sides knew that a landing would take place, but the Argentinians would not know when. On May 18<sup>th</sup>, the Task Force was finally equipped with its coastal assault component, and preparations for a landing could begin. The original plan was to land all the 2 000 men aboard a single amphibious assault ship, but this was deemed too risky, and on May 19<sup>th</sup>, the forces were split in three. During this transfer, a Sea King helicopter transporting 30 men was hit by a bird and fell to the ocean. 22 men lost their lives, 8 were able to escape in time, as the helicopter sank immediately. This accident overshadowed the operation, but all preparations were completed, and the landing force was ready. The plan was to land in three phases: First, a simultaneous beach landing and a paratrooper landing on the mountains, then artillery and air defence would be brought by helicopters, and finally the last infantrymen would land ashore and move forward to observe the enemy movements. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 298-301.)



On May 21<sup>st</sup>, around midnight, the landing was set to begin. *HMS Glamorgan* was distracting the Argentines by bombing around Stanley, and *HMS Ardent* did the same at Goose Green. Three hours later, an expedition team was sent ashore to deal with an Argentinian group close to the landing spot. After naval gunfire and mortar fire, the Argentinians retreated, but kept fighting back. The British force drove them back, inflicting 12 casualties and taking 9 prisoners. At 3.30 in the morning, the actual landing took place. The weather was favourable and there were no hostiles at the landing site. Only a confused Special Forces patrol was there, since they expected the landing to be the day after. Securing the village of San Carlos, the landing force met 31 civilians, 14 of them children. The day of May 21<sup>st</sup> was spent establishing a defensible position in San Carlos, setting up artillery and anti-air weapons. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 302.)

### 3.3 Argentinian Bombing Runs

At the same time, the Argentinians were suspecting something in San Carlos. There were reports coming in from Stanley and Goose Green, but a sighting of amphibious assaults by a helicopter and the report from the troops that escaped the expedition team had the Argentinians investigate further. A group of nine Dagger fighter jets was sent from the mainland, and reached the islands an hour later, attacking the ships in the coastal waters. No lives were lost, but 2 ships received damage. Later waves hit the *HMS Ardent*, causing it to take in water, lose steering and power to its missile systems. Further attacks came in, and the ship had only small arms to defend itself. Catching fire as well, there was no hope for *Ardent*, and it was evacuated and left to sink, much like the *Sheffield*. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 303.)

Expecting the landing, the Argentinians kept their air component hidden for almost a month, and now brought them into battle. 45 flights reached the Falklands, and in them, ten planes were lost and more had to be grounded for repairs. In their plan to defeat the landing force, the Argentinians' emphasis was in inflicting as much casualties as possible without risking the fighter jets. This failed, as the pilots sometimes targeted friendly ships in their hurry to get back, and sometimes failing to see intercepting aircraft or anti-air fire from the British ships. Also, as they had to fly as low as possible to avoid radar detection, the Argentinian fighters' bombs had no time to arm their explosives in flight, causing the bombs that hit not explode, further diminishing the victories Argentinians so desperately wanted to gain. Even though only two of the ships in the vicinity of San

Carlos were unscathed, and the *Ardent* abandoned, Argentina's air attacks did not deter the actual landing and base establishing in the settlement itself. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 304.)

On the day following the landing, May 22<sup>nd</sup>, it was clear to the Argentinians that the British landing was successful and the area now heavily fortified, armed with artillery and anti-air guns, and it would be close to impossible to suppress its growth and movement. Only 2 waves of fighter jets could be sent from the mainland, due to losses and need of repairs. This quieter day was a relief for the British, especially since the Rapier anti-air missile system was underperforming and having technical issues. The Sea Harriers aboard British aircraft carriers were free to fly above the islands again, conducting scouting missions, but found no hostile aircraft. Instead, they found out that the Falkland Islands native ship *MV Monsunen* was captured by the Argentinians, ferrying men and supplies across the strait between the islands. An assault force was prepared to capture the ship, but when naval gunfire was used to stop the vessel, its crew decided to beach the ship to prevent capture. The ship was left there for later, as it was of no value now. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 306-308.)

The morning of May 23<sup>rd</sup> saw an improvement in weather, and it was clear that the flight activity would increase. Argentinian forces were keen on finding the two British aircraft carriers, but were still unable to do so, even with repeated search flights. Attacks on the British fortification kept going. In the afternoon, four Argentinian A4B fighter jets entered the airspace, and were met with anti-air and small arms fire by the Britons. The fighters' main target was *HMS Antelope*, which had just recently arrived at the Falkland Islands. Yet again, as the fighters had to fly very low to avoid radar detection, the bombs dropped did not have time to properly arm themselves in flight, and therefore did not detonate on impact. One A4B even collided with the mast of the *Antelope* and crashed. A few more waves of jets arrived shortly after, but no ship or jets were hit. Two unexploded bombs were stuck in the side of *Antelope*, and as the crew tried to defuse and remove one, it exploded, killing one and wounding another, and setting off a fire. It was quick to spread, and an order to abandon ship was issued shortly after. Just as the last crew members were able to escape, ordnance aboard the ship exploded, leaving *HMS Antelope* to sink near San Carlos. This raised a lot of concern back in the United Kingdom, especially knowing that on-board *HMS Argonaut* there was still one unexploded bomb. The Task Force realised by this point, that the hills surrounding the bay were hindering air defence capabilities, most importantly radars warning of incoming hostile fighters. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 309.)

It had become evident that the exchange of fighter jets to warships would prove fatal to the Task Force sooner or later. Final attempts of diplomacy were in consideration, as the international pressure kept building up. The British Government did not try to justify their actions by using strategic and economic reasons, such as oil or the islands' location near Latin America. Instead, the government appealed to the moral laws of self-defence, the islanders' right to self-determination, importance of not rewarding aggression, and showing that using force or violence would not yield results. If the British would surrender at Falklands, other Commonwealth countries could be targets for aggression. Therefore, as remote and insignificant the Falkland Islands seemed, they could not be given up, to reinforce the integrity and pride of the Commonwealth. Mainland Europe was strongly with Britain, and NATO declared that they would support the UK in their campaign. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 322.)

United States of America gave massive support to the United Kingdom during the war, both military and political, and the economical sanctions set on Argentina by President Ronald Reagan were effectively crippling the nation's economy, as trade with the US was important to them. But, the atmosphere in Europe was shifting. France and West Germany were pushing Britain to seek a cease-fire, and even the Pope encouraged Prime Minister Thatcher to do so. Thatcher still held strongly to her opinion, that aggression would not be rewarded, and the Falkland Islands would not be surrendered. Negotiations were underway, but both the Argentine representative, Perez de Cuellar, and the UK representative, Baron Pym, were instructed not to give in an inch, by General Galtieri and PM Thatcher, respectively. As the world leaders gathered to a United Nations summit in Versailles on June 3<sup>rd</sup>, after lengthy negotiations, Britain gained the united support of the world, and it was decided that Argentina would have to withdraw its troops and let Britain reclaim and rebuild the islands before they had to withdraw. Up to this point, the Task Force had retaken much of the islands, and Argentinian defeat was imminent, nonetheless. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 342-343.)

### **3.4 The Battle of Goose Green**

May 27<sup>th</sup> marked the day when the amphibious ships had disembarked their troops, and the *Bristol* carrier group had arrived. The Argentinian Navy had also retreated, as they thought that the odds against them were heavily unfavourable and went hiding in Argentina's coastal waters. May 30<sup>th</sup> was the first time when Argentinian Air Force and Naval Aviation co-operated, sending in 6 fighters to attack the British. Their aim was to destroy the aircraft carrier *HMS Invincible*, but due to misinformation, shot the last remaining airborne *Exocet* missile in the whole country at *HMS Avenger*, and missed the target. The first two fighters then veered off to refuel, and the remaining

four were met with anti-air missiles, and two were taken down. This raid was considered a huge failure from the Argentinians. They had no airborne anti-ship missiles left, but no-one else knew about it, and the threat still lingered. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 346-347.)

While the war raged on sea, preparations for the land attack were underway. Goose Green, the second largest settlement after Stanley, was the next step in retaking the islands. Some higher-ups feared that Goose Green would be a distraction from Stanley, the main target. The Task Force's reconnaissance had figured out a route to Stanley with only a little resistance, but the commanders were divided. Argentinians stationed at Goose Green could flank the British if they found about their plans to advance to Stanley. This, and the notion of showing the UK that the Task Force is making good progress, decided that Goose Green would be recaptured. The amphibious assault ships had unloaded and were leaving San Carlos, and the Argentinian Air Force set their sights on the men ashore. A raid consisting of four A4B fighters dropped their bombs, killing six and injuring 30 others. To the Britons' relief, the bombs hitting the medical and logistics teams did not explode, due to the planes flying low. Losing those two components would have been disastrous to the offensive. This attack served as an incentive to keep moving further inland, to better air cover. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 355.)

While preparing to assault Goose Green, the soldiers heard on BBC radio that they had already taken the settlement. Both astonished and disappointed, their morale took a hit from the fake news, and the attack helicopter sighted around Goose Green did not help. BBC's representative on the islands, Robert Fox, took the initial blame, but was innocent. In truth, the BBC in UK misinterpreted Minister of Defence John Nott's statement that the troops were advancing. The press did not know how much the troops had moved, so they assumed Goose Green was taken. Perhaps the BBC pulled the trigger on this just to get the word out first and claim the bragging rights. The news reached Argentina, but they dismissed it as propaganda and psychological warfare. Concern raised among British troops; had their element of surprise been lost? Argentinian plans were not changed regarding the news, but the British could not know that. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 356-357.)

Nonetheless, the assault on Goose Green had to begin soon. 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, Parachute Regiment, known as 2 Para and consisting of 620 men, was assigned this task. May 28<sup>th</sup>, at 2 AM, the attack begun with fire support from *HMS Arrow*. Half an hour later, the first company from 2 Para engaged the first Argentinian encampment on the hills surrounding Goose Green, but to their surprise, the enemy retreated without much resistance due to the naval fire support. At dawn, 2 Para had made good progress in Goose Green, but only now were they facing the main Argentinian

force. *HMS Arrow* had to leave for its own safety, and poor weather conditions did not allow for Harrier fighter jets to support the troops on the ground. Daylight would turn the tide of battle for the defenders, and the Argentinians were well entrenched. The attack lost its tempo and was slowing down significantly. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 364.)

From this assault, a great story was born. Colonel Jones, 2 Para's commanding officer, decided to lead from the front. Other commanders would often stay back and protected, but Jones lead by example. He charged forward, despite the heavy incoming fire. He was hit but carried on regardless of his injuries. After being hit a second time, he finally fell, for the last time. News quickly reached HQ, but the British troops did not lose faith, and with resilience, they pressed on. Along with them, the troops had 66mm anti-tank rockets, and they were put to good use, destroying the machine gun trench and allowing further movement. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 365.) Colonel Jones was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross, the highest commendation a Briton can get. (The London Gazette, 1982, p. 12831.)

Soon after this, the Argentinians raised white flags, seeing as they had lost 18 men and 36 were wounded, totalling up to over half of the 92 men they had. Progress had indeed been made, and the probability of an Argentinian counterattack succeeding was lowered. Still, by midday, the battle was going, and it was long overtime. Daylight favoured the defenders, and as the original British plan was to swiftly cut through the trenches, their supplies were not quite enough for a drawn-out battle. The Argentinians were even using immoral tactics; raising a white flag to indicate surrendering, but as the Brits moved to investigate, they would open fire again. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 366.)

Coming into the town proper of Goose Green, the civilians held there raised caution. The British drafted an ultimatum, and it was sent to the Argentinians by an Argentinian prisoner of war. It contained 2 options: surrender or be met with lethal force. The Argentinian commanders had realised that they could not hold out indefinitely and ordered their troops to stand down. The Union Jack flew once again above Goose Green, and 112 civilians were released unharmed. Seeing that the Argentinian forces were pushed back but not defeated, the battle could have taken many lives of soldiers and civilians alike. Evidence supports the fact that Argentinian forces were poorly supplied, as the houses were looted for food. The victory at Goose Green gave promise to the Task Force that their mission could be accomplished, and the Falkland Islands be liberated. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 368-369.)

After claiming the hills west of Stanley, it was time to move in on the capital. Resistance was expected to be heavy, with numbers up to 8 000 Argentinians were speculated to be garrisoned in Stanley. (p.370.) At Goose Green, the Task Force learned the importance of fire support. Lack of it in the battle lead to significantly slower movement and strained the capabilities of troops. Some time had passed as the force made its way across the hills, and on June 14<sup>th</sup>, the time had come for the final stretch. Argentinians were retreating from the nearby hills and settlements towards Stanley, worn out both physically and mentally from the battles. The final skirmish was at noon, and after that, the road to Stanley was open. British forces closed in on Stanley from every direction, as it became clear that the Argentinians did not want to resist further. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 414.)

### **3.5 Argentina Surrenders**

After what happened at Goose Green, the Argentinians on the Falkland Islands had discussed surrendering. On June 12<sup>th</sup>, commander of the Argentinian forces on the islands, Major General Menendez contacted then-president Galtieri and explained that further resistance would result in only more casualties for nothing. Galtieri could not believe it and told Menendez to keep fighting with every available asset. As Menendez told him that there was basically nothing to fight with anymore, and the men were on the verge of collapsing from exhaustion, Galtieri finally gave the order to start negotiations, even so with unreasonable conditions. Due to broken links in the chain of command, Menendez could not tell the Navy and Air Force to stand down, only his own Army on the islands. He contacted Galtieri once again and received assurance that the Navy and Air Force would retreat. The word took some time to reach every Argentinian soldier, some of them kept fighting until the 14<sup>th</sup>. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 419-420.)

After the victory, there were no parades or cheering civilians waiting in Stanley. The troops were exhausted, hungry and water was running low. Many buildings were destroyed in the shelling, including houses and the water filtration plant. Men were starting to get restless, and after some looting incidents had taken place, a curfew was implemented. Days passed, and finally, on 25<sup>th</sup> of June, the first ships could head back to the United Kingdom. It was until September that the final ships were repaired and ready to depart on the long voyage back home. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 421.)

#### **4. Media aboard the Task Force**

Regarding media coverage of the event, due to its nature and location far away, there was sparsely any third-party information available. Almost all the news came to the UK through military and government channels, and some through the United States. The UK press was had to be controlled to prohibit release of potentially dangerous information, as on the May 3rd issue of the Daily Express, where members of the Special Boat Squadron could be identified. So-called “minders”, government officials, had to be assigned to each media house, and they would then help to assess if the information about to be released would be harmful. These minders were perhaps too eager on their mission, as the post-war studies show: whole stories were erased, and alterations were made because of “too many emotional adjectives”, rather than just the offending sentences altered not to have sensitive information. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 263.)

Britain still wanted the people to know what was going on, but only the good news. Bad news, such as the sinking of HMS Sheffield, could have a negative effect on the people’s opinion of defending the Falkland Islands. The handful of press representatives on board the Task Force’s ships were severely restricted in what they could report on. News reached London faster through other routes than through them, and naturally the representatives were dissatisfied with their treatment. The commander of the aircraft carrier group, Admiral Woodward, had to deal with the press and saw this as an additional burden on his already busy schedule. This clash of interest would have its effect, when Woodward’s words were taken out of context, and the message was now that the conflict will be long and bloody, which was not the Admiral’s intention. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 264.)

The British Broadcasting Corporation, known worldwide as BBC, had a confrontation with the Ministry of Defence back in London. The Corporation’s policy of “balance”, where Argentinian and British sources were treated as equally creditable, raised thought in the MoD. BBC was irritated by the MoD, because they knew that they were not always given the whole truth, and their independence and credit were at risk. They also had to worry about their journalist detachment of the conflict, since it was easy to fall for calling British forces “ours”, and the journalists were specifically told not to do so. The Editor of News and Current Affairs at BBC stated that “we are not Britain”, “we are the BBC”, and the usage of “our” should be left for BBC affairs, to avoid taking sides and to retain their independence from the government. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 265.)

After the HMS Sheffield had taken the fatal hit and was doomed to sink, the military commanders in charge wanted to withhold the news, to keep the sinking out of Argentinian ears. Since the

Argentinian force lacked the ability to perform post- attack reconnaissance and confirm the hit, they would know if their attacks were successes by looking at British media. It has been said, that if the Sheffield sinking had been kept a secret, Argentina would have deemed the Exocet missiles incapable and used some other weapon, with less actual capabilities. A smaller, but yet important matter was informing the families of the ones lost on HMS Sheffield, not letting them see it on the news first and get a confirmation later. As a response, Ministry of Defence ruled that news would not be delayed, to keep false rumours from spreading and causing ill effects in the people. Since everyone cannot be appeased, the families of the ones aboard Sheffield were unhappy of their treatment, and reporters harassing them for a reaction caused further unrest. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 266.)

To counter the negative effects of media, a Special Projects Group (SPG) was established for deception and psychological operations. Their task was to help the Task Force's public image by presenting their actions and capabilities in a better light, and to discredit and demoralise Argentinian forces. Since the British media was a source of information for Argentina, the Special Projects Group would mislead them about timing of attacks and other small details, without actually creating false information, so the public would not notice. BBC could not be used for psychological operations, to keep its public image untarnished, so the Special Projects Group would use the UK's secret services to plant false information into the Argentinian garrison on the Falkland Islands. Claims of rivalries between military branches, rumours about the junta's internal disputes, and economic discrepancies were planted to raise dissatisfaction and lower morale amongst the Argentinians. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 266-267.)



## 5. Methodology

The aim of Critical Discourse Analysis, CDA for short, is described by Fairclough (2010) as “to develop ways of analysing language which address its involvement in the workings of contemporary capitalist societies.” (p. 10). As for analysis itself using CDA, Fairclough says: “It is *not* analysis of discourse ‘in itself’ as one might take it to be, but analysis of dialectical relations between discourse and other objects, elements or moments, as well as analysis of the ‘internal relations’ of discourse. Since analysis of such relations cuts across conventional boundaries between disciplines (linguistics, politics, sociology and so forth), CDA is an interdisciplinary form of analysis, or as I shall prefer to call it a *transdisciplinary* form.” (2010, p. 10.) From here, it can be deducted that text is not the only form of affecting, and we must take the author, the media, the targeted audience and the desired outcome in consideration as we analyse the newspapers.

For methods, Fairclough gives us four stages (2010, p. 226):

Stage 1: Focus upon a social wrong, in its semiotic aspect.

Stage 2: Identify obstacles to addressing the social wrong.

Stage 3: Consider whether the social order ‘needs’ the social wrong.

Stage 4: Identify possible ways past the obstacles.

Using these stages, or steps as they are a guideline, we can dissect an article and determine its reasons for doing what it had done, why the writer used language as such and so forth. Social wrongs can be phenomena such as dehumanising the enemy in warfare, and obstacles to addressing it are things that make the righting of the wrong harder, for example the origin country of the publication and the reigning political atmosphere in said country. The social order needing the social wrong will be discussed further on, as we get into the newspapers themselves, as well as the possible ways past them. Often, in matters regarding tabloids, the language and its goal are the problem.

## 6. Material: Newspapers

Modern-day British newspapers have long roots, some extending to the 1700's. Newspapers' sales figures have gone down since the dawn of internet, but they still have a place in the British society as a stable of reputable information, at least some of them. UK newspapers can be divided into subgroups, popular/tabloid and quality press/broadsheet. The tabloid group can be split into two even smaller groups, respectable and sensationalist tabloids. Tabloids' articles are usually short, and the pages are filled with material to look at more than read; pictures, large headlines and colourful advertising, as Jeremy Tunstall says. (Cited by Bellot, 2018, p. 86.)

The broadsheet or as they are colloquially known, "heavies", are usually more objective in their narrative, with the articles being longer and more thought-provoking. (Tunstall, cited by Bellot, 2018, p.86.) From here, we can argue that the papers cater to different audiences: Tabloids' main consumers are low- to middle-class, working class citizens with little time to read long, sprawling articles, as they just want the quick news in form of headlines. Broadsheet readers can be generally speaking said to be well-educated, higher class people, with time and will to truly read into the article and think more about the subject. For the subject of examination, there are two front pages of The Sun, and two front pages and two articles from The Guardian from the Falklands War time period to analyse in this thesis.

### 6.1. The Sun

The Sun is a tabloid newspaper in the United Kingdom, established in its current form in 1969, after it was purchased by Rupert Murdoch and his News Corp. The paper has a circulation of around 1,4 million papers sold daily, (newsworks.org.uk, 2019) with article emphasis on celebrities, sports, and other phenomena of the like. The Sun has a somewhat negative reputation, due to its controversial involvement in matters such as the Hillsborough Stadium disaster in 1989, where 96 people died as a result of a stand collapsing during a football match between Nottingham Forest and Liverpool FC. Some days later, while the people of England were still mourning the lost lives, The Sun's headline falsely read "THE TRUTH: - Some fans picked pockets of victims -Some fans urinated on the brave cops -Some fans beat up PC giving kiss of life", this referring to Liverpool fans. Later on, these accusations were proven false, but the people of Liverpool still refer to The Sun as "The Scum", for loathing their image in the eyes of other Englishmen. (Carter & Gibson, 2009.) Even though this happened later in the 1980's, the coverage of Hillsborough Stadium defines The Sun and crystallises their ruthless attitude towards journalism.

## 6.2 The Guardian

Originally founded as *The Manchester Guardian* in 1821, The Guardian is a well-established broadsheet paper in the United Kingdom. The owner of the paper in 1936, John Russell Scott, established the Scott Trust to strengthen the paper's financial matters, as well as its independency. He announced that all the funds that would have otherwise been divided among shareholders, would now be held in the Trust, and from there, the surplus funds would be used to further improve the paper and expand circulation. With sales figures rising steadily, the Manchester Guardian renamed itself to just The Guardian, representing its spread across the island nation. Further establishing its nationwide position, the paper's head office and editorial staff were moved to London in 1964. The rise would not be infinite, and The Guardian relied heavily on outside resources for financial support. (*History of the Guardian*, 2017.)

During the mid-1960's, there were talks with *The Times* to relieve both parties' financial struggles by merging into one bigger company, but the editor of The Guardian at the time, Alastair Hetherington, would not give the paper's independence away so easily. This move, and Hetherington's overall vision still acts as a guideline for the modern Guardian to follow. After the financial struggles were over decades later, the political climate had polarised. The Guardian aligned itself with the left, cementing its position with the coverage of the Miners' Strike in 1984-1985. A competitor emerged in 1986, when the *Independent* released its first issue. Filling the political void between The Guardian on the left and the Times and the Telegraph on the right, the rising circulation of the Independent brought life to the stagnated newspaper market. (*History of the Guardian*, 2017.)

Trying to re-establish their image as the leading press and distinguishing themselves from their former, struggling selves, The Guardian revamped its design in 1988, marking the start of the paper's modern era. As the Independent and the Times were competing with prices, the Times hitting as low as 20 pence for an issue, the Guardian stayed at full price, directing funds towards better quality journalism and trying to stay ahead in publishing breaking news. For the whole 2000's, The Guardian has remained a staple of journalist standards in the United Kingdom, consistently winning awards across the journalistic section. In 2005, the paper was shrunk into the mid-size Berliner format, and in 2018, further into the tabloid format, trying to stay convenient and competitive in the modern era of instant news read from smart devices and computers. (*History of the Guardian*, 2017.)

## 7. Analysis

The analysis of the newspapers covering the Falklands War revolves around Critical Discourse Analysis and following the four stages presented by Fairclough (2010, p. 226). Of course, being as multi-faceted as it is, there is much room left for personal interpretation and analysis. Knowing that Argentina was the initial aggressor in the conflict, media impressions would impedingly be negative towards them. The United Kingdom was the expected victor, and the UK newspapers do reflect that attitude, capitalising on losses of friendly ships and lives.

### 7.1. Analysis of The Sun



Figure 2. *The Sun*, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 1982, front page.

The most infamous example of *The Sun*'s aggressive and pro-war journalism is the "GOTCHA" headline on May 4<sup>th</sup>, in reference to the sinking of *ARA General Belgrano*. The attack was the first real battle contact in the war that had lasted for over a month by then, and the press, especially the

tabloids, were desperate for something concrete to report on. Referring to Fairclough's CDA stages (2010, p. 226), we can begin to analyse the meaning behind this front page. The social wrong in this case is the Falklands War and the (mis-)representation of the Argentinians in relation to the British in the Sun. Obstacles in the way of addressing the social wrong are for example the publication coming from the United Kingdom. It is hard to stay unbiased, if you or in this case, your nation is taking part in a conflict, where in the end a winner will emerge. Positive and negative biases are bound to emerge towards your own side and the opposing side, respectively.

The lead paragraph on the front page reads: "THE NAVY had the Argies on their knees last night after a devastating double punch." Analysing only this one sentence, we can see multiple errors in taste and journalism standards. The word "Argie" or "Args" is often repeated in The Sun's coverage, and by using it, the paper tries to rob the Argentinian forces of their pride, achievements and credit. "Argie" instead of Argentinian, sounds playful, even childish, and presents the enemy as not very serious, a small threat that can be easily thwarted. By using the phrase "on their knees" paints a mental image of the Argentinians being literally on their knees against the superior Brits, a very generalising and perhaps even a false statement, as we know from the history portion of this thesis that the Argentinians were a serious contender, afflicting heavy casualties upon the British. "A devastating double punch", referring to the sinking of *ARA General Belgrano* and a second Argentinian ship, yet again adds to the mental image where the two sides of battle are two persons throwing punches at each other. This is perhaps an easier way for the general public to understand the battles, instead of elaborate depictions of how the battles went in reality.

**THE Sun** £50,000 BINGO See Page 24

Friday, April 23, 1982 14p TODAY'S TV: PAGE 14

**BATTLE FOR THE ISLANDS**

# STICK IT UP YOUR JUNTA

## 1am: Maggie No to deal—then Argentina invokes war treaty



**PREMIER Margaret Thatcher called a Falklands war cabinet last night — and quickly gave a frosty answer to Argentina's latest peace moves.**

As talking finished in the early hours, the British response was clearly: Stick it up your junta!

A statement from Downing Street said that the Foreign Office proposals "did not meet the requirements strongly expressed by Parliament."

Argentina immediately hit back by calling on every South American country to come to their defence.

The Junta announced it is to ask for an organisation of American States to invoke the Treaty of Rio — a Nato-style defence pact.

This could mean that the 21 member countries — including the United States — are obliged to give military support.

Argentine Foreign Minister Carlos Menéndez was summoned to the crisis room.

He warned Mrs Thatcher that it would cloud everything over the end of her Premiership if she backed down.

**JOINED**

The Premier announced that she was on her way to Washington after consulting details of Argentina's peace proposals in London.

She was joined by Home Secretary William Whitely.

Peace over Holy yesterday ... Flying back to Washington

Continued on Page Two

★ **BRITISH** envoy Richard Hardy shares a smile with his 21-year-old Argentine bride Alicia Ponce after their wedding in Buenos Aires.

The couple planned to marry next month, but rushed the ceremony through yesterday because of the Falklands crisis which divides their countries.

### LOVE CONQUERS ALL FOR ENVOY

Figure 3. The Sun, April 20<sup>th</sup>, 1982, front page.

Some two weeks earlier, April 20<sup>th</sup>, The Sun reported on Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher deciding not to give up on the Falkland Islands, effectively announcing war with Argentina. The headline "STICK IT UP YOUR JUNTA", referring to the Argentinian military government, the Junta, was not said by any official, and was made up only to provoke the British people. (See figure 3.) A common way of expressing dissatisfaction with someone and an idea, for example, is to tell them to "stick it up your...". This is a very derogatory expression, and in conjunction of the Argentinian government, very unfit for a press headline. The sub-headline, reading "1am: Maggie No to deal – then Argentina invokes war treaty", tries to tell the people that Argentina is the sole antagonist in this whole crisis, and mighty Britain just has to go to war with them. Of course, war was not the only possible course of action, and Margaret Thatcher's gamble of a decision to go to war could have ended badly.

The use of the nickname “Maggie” for Margaret Thatcher was perhaps a measure to save real estate on the valuable front page, but perhaps as a way to diminish her value as Prime Minister. After all, she was the first female Prime Minister in the United Kingdom, and her support before the Falklands War was receding due to the recession and climbing unemployment rate. (Denman; McDonald, 1996, p. 7.) Thatcher was a Conservative, centre-right, and The Sun was right wing as well, but it might have been that her being female, The Sun would have wanted a man leading the party and the government.

## **5.2. Analysis of The Guardian**

The Guardian, being a broadsheet paper, covered the Falklands War in a neutral style, with more respect to both sides of the war. In contrast to The Sun, their coverage extended over diplomacy matters as well, as the sub- headline in the issue of April 5<sup>th</sup> says: “Intense diplomatic activity begins as Falklands are placed under curfew and task force prepares”. Indeed, the main headline says: “We won’t hesitate, says Nott”, but that is at least somewhat informative, in comparison to tabloid headlines. The juxtaposing of “Argies” and “our lads” is neutralized to just Argentinians and British. In the 4-paragraph article, not a single time was “our” or “their” mentioned, as the paper wished to remain neutral and a third-party observer of the conflict, not an active participator.



# HMS Sheffield and Harrier destroyed

By David Fairhall,  
Defence Correspondent

British forces in the South Atlantic suffered their first serious losses yesterday afternoon when the destroyer HMS Sheffield was hit and destroyed by an Argentinean missile and a Sea Harrier was shot down while attacking an airstrip on the Falklands.

HMS Sheffield, with a crew of 270, is believed to have been hit by an Exocet radar-guided missile fired either from a naval bomber or an Argentinean destroyer.

Her crew abandoned her when she got out of control and were picked up, but there were casualties—about 30 sailors missing, Mr Nott, the Defence Secretary, told the Commons last night, and other casualties were likely.

The captain and nearly all the ship's company have been accounted for, he said.

Other crisis reports, page 2; Parliament, page 7; Leader comment, letters, page 12; Peter Jenkins Terry Coleman, page 13; Market shrugs off crisis, page 17; Argentine fighting talk, back page.

The Sea Harrier is believed to have been shot down during an attack on the Argentineans' secondary airstrip at Goose Green. It followed a night bombing raid on the main airfield at Port Stanley by a Vulcan V-bomber flying from Ascension Island. The Vulcan returned safely but the Harrier pilot, whose name will not be released until next-of-kin have been informed, was killed.

An Argentinean communiqué put the time of the raid at 6.50 pm London time, claiming two Harriers brought down by anti-aircraft fire.

Last night's communiqué

from the Ministry of Defence in London stated: "In the course of its duties within the total exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, HMS Sheffield, a Type 42 destroyer, was attacked and hit late this afternoon by an Argentine missile.

"The ship caught fire, which spread out of control. When there was no longer any hope of saving the ship the ship's company abandoned ship. All who abandoned her were picked up. It is feared there have been a number of casualties but we have no details of them yet. Next-of-kin will be informed first as soon as details are received."

The Exocet is a "fire and forget" sea-skimming anti-ship missile designed and built by the French. The British task force carries it and so do nine of Argentina's destroyers and frigates, almost certainly including the two destroyers that were escorting the cruiser General Belgrano when she was attacked and sunk by the British nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine Conqueror on Sunday night with heavy loss of life.

But unconfirmed reports indicated last night that the missile may have been launched from one of the Argentinean Navy's newly delivered French-built Super Etendard naval fighter bombers.

Royal Navy chiefs were said last night to be "totally stunned" by the loss of Sheffield, which is believed to have sunk as the fire worked through her. "They just can't believe it," said one Defence Ministry official.

Sheffield was the first of the Navy's Type 42 destroyers, built primarily for the Sea Dart medium-range air defence missile they carry, along with a Lynx anti-submarine helicopter. She was launched by the



Ian Macdonald: gave the bad news

Queen from Vickers's Barrow-in-Furness yard in 1971.

Her commanding officer is Captain James "Sam" Salt, aged 42, who lives in Petersfield, Hampshire, with his wife, Penelope.

Argentina last night withheld an official report on the Sheffield but sources claimed that six Super Etendard planes had been responsible for the strike. An official communiqué stated that two Sea Harriers had been shot down over the Falklands, with one pilot killed.

British sources say that Argentina has five Super Etendards. It had ordered 14 but the remainder have been held in France because of the arms embargo which followed the Argentine invasion of the Falklands.

It is a powerful, versatile single-engined fighter bomber designed originally to operate from the French Navy's carriers, refuelling in flight if necessary. The Argentines presumably intend to use it from their own elderly ex-

British carrier, the *Veinticinco de Mayo*, but the aircraft which destroyed HMS Sheffield probably operated from the mainland airbase at Rio Gallegos in southern Argentina.

It is understood that the British destroyer was lying to the west of the main Royal Navy task force, acting as an air defence picket with her Sea Dart missiles—which coincidentally have the same range of about 25 miles as Exocets.

The Defence Ministry last night issued the following numbers for relatives to call in for news of casualties: Rosyth — 0383 412191; Faslane — 0436 71125; Plymouth — 0752 666666; Portland — 0305 821547; Portsmouth — 0705 827671; Chatham — 0834 812771.

Ian Aitken adds: The Prime Minister received the first news of the attack at about 6 pm, while she was chairing a meeting of the Cabinet's most senior committee dealing with the economy. She is understood to have been extremely upset.

But Mrs Thatcher and the other members of her inner Cabinet went ahead with a subsequent meeting of the war Cabinet, scheduled to discuss the latest diplomatic moves taken by US Secretary of State, Mr Alexander Haig, and the Peruvian President.

Although ministers approved a British peace plan based on the UN Resolution 502, the discussion took place against the background of the certainty of substantial British casualties in the South Atlantic.

Sources close to Mrs Thatcher insisted that she had never expected that the recent run of good luck for the task force could continue unbroken.

If Mrs Thatcher was braced for bad news, many Tory MPs were not. Many appear to have been unprepared for the shock.

Figure 4. The Guardian, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 1982.

On May 4<sup>th</sup>, as the battles had truly begun, and lives were lost, The Guardian reported on the losses of destroyer HMS Sheffield and one fighter jet, a Sea Harrier, as seen in figure 4. This is not from the front page, but in turn, it gives a good example of the use of language. The coverage is still neutral, but this time, the article is 23 paragraphs long, a very detailed description on what happened to the destroyer and the fighter jet, and also has comments from Defence Ministry officials. The article explains that HMS Sheffield was sunk by an Exocet missile and goes on to elaborate of the Exocet's French origins and its tactical capabilities, such as "fire and forget" and sea-skimming abilities. This points us towards the targeted audience: highly educated men, perhaps with military knowledge back from World War II, and people with genuine interest in the matter. Yet again, no sign of "our" and "their", as the style remains neutral even with serious British casualties.



# Fleet may pull back to avoid missile attacks

By David Fairhall,  
Defence Correspondent

The burning hulk of the destroyer HMS Sheffield was still afloat off the Falklands yesterday, visible proof of a fatal flaw in the air defences of the Royal Navy's task force. She was lying about 70 miles from the islands' coast, where she was hit on Tuesday afternoon by a long-range missile from an Argentinian naval bomber.

Mr John Nott, the Defence Secretary, confirmed in the Commons yesterday that the Sheffield had been attacked by French-built Super Etendard jets, which launched two Exocet sea-skimming anti-ship missiles. One of them missed the destroyer but the other hit her amidships.

Confronted by this formidable combination, against which there is no guaranteed defence short of total air supremacy, the British task force commander, Rear Admiral "Sandwich" Woodward, may by now have pulled his capital ships back beyond the range of further air attacks from the mainland while he has discussions with his commanders about new defensive tactics.

This might help to explain the apparent sparsity of information reaching London yesterday. Mr Nott could not explain US reports, apparently prompted by a heavy burst of radio traffic, that another naval battle was being fought yesterday. "I can't be sure," he told MPs, but we have no reports on it and I checked on it quite recently.

The task force commander's essential problem is that because the Exocet missile has a range of more than 25 miles, the aircraft which launches it scarcely appears above the British

warships' radar horizon before losing its weapon and making its escape. Apart from the short-range Seawolf missiles which are protecting the Royal Navy's carriers, therefore, and possible electronic counter measures, the only defence is to intercept the aircraft at long range and low level—a task for which the Sea Harrier is by no means ideal.

Admiral Woodward has only 18 Sea Harriers and he knows that now the Argentinians have found a formula which unlocks his air defence screen, they will sooner or later try to destroy another ship.

Mr Nott, confirmed that 30 members of the Sheffield's

**Hint at Soviet involvement, Aid from Venezuela, page 2; Lethal combination, Parliament, page 3; Leader comment, letters, page 12; Peter Jenkins, page 13; Shares down on escalation, page 18; Payment to P&O, Battle fever increases, back page.**

crew were still missing and that others were being given medical assistance aboard the ships which picked them up. The Navy's fire-fighting teams had struggled for four hours, he said, before the order was given to abandon ship.

Unofficial Whitehall sources suggested yesterday that another threat to the British task force was the Argentinian Navy's two modern German-built diesel submarines. This is plausible. Indeed, Mr Nott himself told the Commons on Tuesday that the British forces earlier located and attacked what was believed to be an Argentinian submarine — they would know from the noise "signature" — which was "clearly in a position to torpedo our ships." It was not

known if the submarine was hit.

The Ministry of Defence could offer no clarification yesterday of a report from the Guardian's correspondent aboard HMS Invincible that a fishing boat opened fire on a Royal Navy helicopter off Port Stanley, or a news agency report from Buenos Aires that a Soviet or Polish fishing boat may have been accidentally sunk by British helicopters. The agency report quoted a naval source, and referred to Argentinian newspaper reports that an unidentified fishing boat had heard an SOS from a downed Argentinian pilot and had gone in search of him with a naval patrol vessel when they were both attacked by British helicopters.

Superficially, these reports match the official British announcement that in the early hours of Monday morning a Royal Navy Sea King helicopter was fired upon by an unidentified vessel 90 miles north of the Falklands and that this vessel and another similar ship were then attacked with Sea Skua radar-guided missiles by two Lynx helicopters. One was sunk and the other badly damaged.

Both ships were later described by the Ministry of Defence as "armed ocean-going tugs used by the Argentinian Navy as 'patrol craft' and one was provisionally identified as the 700-ton Alferéz Sobral."

Mr Nott added in a Commons statement that both had "attacked" the British helicopters, which again suggested that they were armed. The fishing boat outside Port Stanley was evidently armed.

The uncertainty may shortly be cleared up by the crew of the Alferéz Sobral, which was reported yesterday to be limping into the Argentinian harbour at Port Desire.

Figure 5. The Guardian, May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1982.

The following day, in the issue of May 5<sup>th</sup>, the article titled "Fleet may pull back to avoid missile attacks" (see figure 5) begins by telling that the burning remains of HMS Sheffield are still afloat, and by describing it as "visible proof of a fatal flaw in the air defences of the Royal Navy's task force". This is a bold statement to make, seeing as the loss of the destroyer was already a great one to the nation. The article goes on to state that the Argentine fighter jets, armed with Exocet missiles, is a formidable foe to the British task force, and the fleet has to pull back to remain safe from attacks. Sensationalist publications were not exactly eager to publish this kind of information, since their pro-war stance prohibits admitting defeats.



Figure 6. The Guardian, June 15<sup>th</sup>, 1982, front page.

The Argentinean force surrenders on June 14<sup>th</sup>, and the issue of June 15<sup>th</sup> reported on the British victory. “Ceasefire in Falklands as Stanley is surrendered”, reads the front-page headline (see figure 6). The article goes on to tell how Thatcher told the House of Commons that the Argentinians had retreated. This decisive victory would have been the perfect opportunity to tell how “our lads” were valiant and heroic in their conquest of the lost lands, but in broadsheet style, The Guardian states the fact that although the Argentinians have surrendered, there will be no further repercussions forced on them, and no war crimes will be tolerated.

These were the first news of the Argentinian surrender and the possible end of the war, and there was not any political influence yet, only the situation explained as well as possible. Only afterwards, The Guardian praises Margaret Thatcher for her role in the decision-making. Here, the focus is on the islands rather than in the Parliament, with pictures of the commanders of both sides, Major-General Jeremy Moore and General Menendez, from Britain and Argentina, respectively. Also, the map of the eastern side of East Falklands is shown, to put the fight for Stanley in proportion to the general audience.





Figure 7. The Guardian, June 16<sup>th</sup>, 1982, front page.

On June 16<sup>th</sup>, two days after the Argentinian forces had surrendered, The Guardian's front-page headline was "Thatcher triumphs as war doubts linger", as seen in figure 7. Since Thatcher was indeed the main driving force of the British decision to go to war, it is only natural to give her credit for the victory. At this point though, there were Argentinian troops on the islands, and the Navy and Air Force components coming from mainland Argentina could not be assured as surrendered. Interestingly, the victory is credited to Margaret Thatcher in the headline, and the first paragraph reads "The Prime Minister last night secured the greatest personal political triumph from her parliamentary colleagues since the end of the second world war." This might incline that The Guardian was pro-Thatcher at the time, since many other reasons contributed towards winning the war, not just the Prime Minister. Of course, Thatcher was the main driving force in the decision going to war, and since other MoP's (Members of the Parliament) were prepared to just give the Falklands away, it was not completely unreasonable to give Thatcher the credit she deserved.

Another interesting point is that in the main picture on the front page is not Thatcher, even though the headline refers to her. Pictured there, again, is Major-General Moore, the commander of the Task Force, being greeted heartily by civilians in Stanley. This picture gives the campaign a worker figure, someone for the general public to thank for the actual battles won on the islands.

## 6. Conclusion

The Falklands War was a result of long-standing border disputes, as well as Argentina's new government's desire to prove their worth to their own people, and to show the world that they are a formidable military and political force by trying to claim the Falkland Islands. Since it takes more than one to wage war, Britain can not be left out of this "spotlight of shame"; Margaret Thatcher was keen on proving herself to the world as well, being the first female Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Her quick decision to go to war could have ended disastrously, but seasoned commanders in the Task Force played their part excellently, and the islands remained British. As said before, if the UK would have given up on the Falklands, it would have demonstrated the world, how the Commonwealth had weakened, and could not defend all its areas and inhabitants. Thatcher gambled heavily, going against a force that could use land ports and airfields, but the UK's technological and strategic superiority did prove itself.

In the light of the evidence presented, it is reasonable to argue that not all British newspapers were equal in terms of neutrality and professionalism, regarding their coverage of the Falklands War. Tabloid papers and their use of language had tendencies of political influencing and glorification of war. The usage of "ours" versus "the Argies" is a prime example of xenophobic attitude towards the Argentinians, robbing them of their proper term, denouncing them with a bare nickname. The British war effort is referred to as "ours" by The Sun, making it feel that much more emotional to the British nation. BBC was specifically telling its journalists to adhere to standards of good journalism and not use the term, instead referring it as "British", and retain their neutrality that way. Critical Discourse Analysis proved as a valuable asset in examining The Sun and exposing their unprofessional attitude towards Argentinians in the Falklands War. The Guardian, on the other hand, had a more dignified approach, with their headlines and frontpages providing more information to the readers. Their content was also more neutral, with both participants of the war being referred with their proper names, in all honesty and neutrality.

## References

- Bellot, A. (2018). The Faces of the Enemy: The Representation of the 'Other' in the Media Discourse of the Falklands War Anniversary. *Journal of War and Culture Studies*, 11(1), 79-97.
- Carter, H; Gibson, O. (2009). Hillsborough: 20 years on, Liverpool has still not forgiven the newspaper it calls 'The Scum'. *The Guardian*, retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2009/apr/18/hillsborough-anniversary-sun-newspaper> January 14<sup>th</sup>, 2019.
- Denman, James; McDonald, Paul (1996). "Unemployment statistics from 1881 to the present day". Government Statistical Service. Retrieved from <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-trends--discontinued-/january-1996/unemployment-since-1881.pdf> December 30<sup>th</sup>, 2018.
- Fairclough, N. (2010). *Critical Discourse Analysis : The Critical Study of Language*. Harlow, England: Routledge. Retrieved from <http://pc124152.oulu.fi:8080/login?url=>
- Freedman, L. (2005a). *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign. Volume I, The Origins of the Falklands War*. London, U.K.: Routledge.
- Freedman, L. (2005b). *The Official history of the Falklands Campaign. Volume II, War and diplomacy*. London; New York: Routledge.
- History of the Guardian*. (2017) Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/gnm-archive/2002/jun/06/1> January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2019.
- Tunstall, J. (1996). *Newspaper Power. The New National Press in Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- The London Gazette*. (1982). Supplement 49134, page 12831. Retrieved from <https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/49134/supplement/12831> February 5<sup>th</sup>, 2019.

newsworks.org.uk (2009) *The Sun*. Retrieved from <https://www.newsworks.org.uk/The-Sun>  
January 14<sup>th</sup>, 2019.

### Figures

*Figure 1. Map of the Falkland Islands.* Wikimedia Commons; retrieved from  
[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Falkland\\_Islands\\_map.svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Falkland_Islands_map.svg) December 29<sup>th</sup>, 2018.

*Figure 2. The Sun, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 1982, front page.*

*Figure 3. The Sun, April 20<sup>th</sup>, 1982, front page.*

*Figure 4. The Guardian, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 1982.* Rainham History; retrieved from <http://blog.rainham-history.co.uk/2012/05/falkland-war-news-headlines-5-may-1982.html> December 29<sup>th</sup>, 2018

*Figure 5. The Guardian, May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1982.* Rainham History; retrieved from <http://blog.rainham-history.co.uk/2012/05/falklands-war-news-headlines-5-may-1982.html> December 29<sup>th</sup>, 2018

*Figure 6. The Guardian, June 15<sup>th</sup>, 1982, front page.* Rainham History; retrieved from  
<http://blog.rainham-history.co.uk/2012/06/falklands-war-thatcher-triumphs.html> December 29<sup>th</sup>,  
2018

*Figure 7. The Guardian, June 16<sup>th</sup>, 1982, front page.* Rainham History; retrieved from  
<http://blog.rainham-history.co.uk/2012/06/falklands-war-thatcher-triumphs.html> December 29<sup>th</sup>,  
2018.